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I. INTRODUCTION

Florida is moving toward a unified family court system. In its May 3,
2001 order adopting findings of the Report of the Family Court Steering
Committee, the Florida Supreme Court declared:
If the judicial system encourages alternatives to the
adversarial process, empowers litigants to reach their own
solutions, and assists in crafting solutions that promote longterm stability in matters involving children and families, the
likelihood of future court intervention in the family should be
decreased - whether this be through minimizing postjudgment litigation or preventing the dependent child oftoday
from becoming the delinquent child of tomorrow. Our
ultimate goal remains to facilitate the resolution of disputes
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involving children and families in a fair, timely, effective and
cost-efficient manner.'
The Florida Supreme Court continued: "We therefore reaffirm our
continued commitment to the broad principles espoused for a model family
court in Florida....
This movement presents Floridians with an opportunity to right a longstanding wrong by extending fundamental due process protection,
particularly the right to counsel, to children who are taken from their
families and placed into the custody of the state. This Article will describe
the proposed unified family court, present a constitutional rationale for
extending the right to counsel to dependent children and suggest how, as
a practical matter, this extension of due process might be accomplished.
II. THE IDEA OF THE UNIFIED FAMILY COURT
Two goals of a model, or unified, family court system are to strengthen
families and to protect children. Families in trouble come to the attention
of the courts in a variety of ways: through divorce, domestic violence,
abandonment or abuse of children, or misbehavior of children. Such families
may spin from courtroom to courtroom caught in a process that depletes
time, money, and energy, and yet never really addresses the core of the
problem. Ironically, children, the intended beneficiaries of our family courts,
suffer most as a result of this phenomenon. It is common, certainly in our
experience at Gator TeamChild, for children to simultaneously be the
subject of cases in the delinquency, dependency, divorce, and even criminal
courts, and to also be facing severe educational and medical challenges.
These children regularly have their interests considered by an army of
judges and bureaucrats and have their liberty restricted by the state. Still,
they may have no stable place to live, no adequate school program, no
medical or dental care, or no family. In our present system, no single court
or agency has a complete picture of the family and the relationships that
affect its members. The idea of the unified family court is to bring the child
and his or her family before a court, preferably one specialized court, to
solve problems. If the problems cannot be solved, then at least the child can
be protected. Because the child is the center of the concerns of the family
court, every legal issue affecting a child should be resolved in one court,

1. In Re Report of Family Court Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d 518, 535-36 (Fla. 2001).

2. Id.
at 536.
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before one judge who can then coordinate agencies and access all the
services that might be available.
The underlying philosophy of such a court is called therapeutic justice.
Therapeutic justice should be a key part of the family court process.
Therapeutic justice is a process that attempts to address the family's
interrelated legal and nonlegal problems to produce a result that
improves the family's functioning. The process should empower
families through skills development, assist them to resolve their own
disputes, provide access to appropriate services, and offer a variety
of dispute resolution forums where the family can resolve problems
without additional emotional trauma.'
Because of the imbalance of the traditional family power structure, an
advocate for the child is essential in this educational and empowerment
exercise.
Provision of services is an important component of the unified family
court. Both referrals and direct services offered by the current court system
are contemplated in the proposed model. In Recommendation #3 Essential Elements, the proposal requires an array of services including case
management, self-help programs, domestic violence programs, alternative
dispute resolution programs, custody evaluations, supervision ofvisitation,4
education programs for parents, and counseling and treatment programs.
An attorney may be the only player in this system with the ability to broker
these services so that they benefit, rather than oppress, the child.
It is beyond doubt that the vision of the Florida Supreme Court and the
Family Court Steering Committee will improve the lives of Florida families
if fully realized. However, it must be noted that this innovative model also
presents opportunities for abuse, particularly in cases of dependency and
delinquency, and especially in cases involving crossover children - those
children who have active cases in both dependency and delinquency court.
A recent example from the true-life files of Gator TeamChild: Johnny
Doe is eleven years old and has been in foster care since he was an infant.
His parents' rights have been terminated and his brother and sister have
been adopted by different families. He has not found a new family, and as
he began to approach adolescence, his behavior started to reflect his anger
and frustration with his circumstances. His caseworker lost the ability to

3. Recommendation #1- Family Court Guiding Principles. In re Report of Family Court
Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d at 522.
4. Recommendation #3 - Essential Elements. In re Report of Family Court Steering
Comm., 794 So. 2d at 526.
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control him. He stopped going to school, even though he had been an
excellent student. He began to bounce from temporary foster home to
temporary foster home, spending his days sitting in the lobby of the
Department of Children and Families' (DCF) offices waiting for his next
change of placement.

One day, as Johnny was sitting in the DCF lobby, he became enraged.
He had asked repeatedly to be allowed to go to the office of his caseworker
to ask her to take him to the park to play basketball. The lobby doors were
locked, and he was not allowed to speak with his caseworker or anybody

else. When the receptionist was away from her desk, he crawled through
the small sliding-glass window in front of her desk and entered the
restricted area. He appeared at his caseworker's office and demanded that
she give him a ride to the park. She refused, but her supervisor happened
along and drove Johnny to the park.
Johnny was peacefully playing basketball a half hour later when the
police arrived and arrested him on the charge of Burglary of an Occupied
Dwelling (for entering the restricted area of the DCF offices). Even though
he had no prior juvenile court record, because the charge was a second
degree felony and because the judge considered special circumstances to
add points to the risk assessment instrument, Johnny was ordered to secure
detention. The DCF moved quickly to have Johnny placed in a residential
treatment center. This move was described to Johnny's counsel as
"caseworker respite." The dependency court judge ordered that Johnny be
placed in residential treatment. The delinquency court judge, although
aware of the dependency court ruling, refused to release Johnny from
detention, even though the charges had not been filed by the State
Attorney. The delinquency court judge held Johnny in detention for a full
twenty-one days. Subsequently, the judge allowed Johnny to be
transported, under maximum security by the Department of Juvenile
Justice, to a treatment center more than two-hundred miles away. The
transport required Johnny to stay overnight at two detention centers in
foreign jurisdictions. He was finally released from secure detention to the
facility personnel from the residential treatment center at 5:00 p.m. on the
twenty-first day of his incarceration.
This abusive use ofdelinquency detention to control dependent children
for the convenience of the DCF will only be more tempting to well-meaning
but frustrated judges in the unified family court. Movement of children
between the delinquency and dependency systems is common and often
improper. The ability of counsel to move similarly between the systems, to
advocate against such abuse and to appeal improper orders, will provide a
vital check on the new system. Because children are at the center of the
new model, it is necessary that there be an actor in this drama charged with
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the responsibility of making the system work for each individual child.
Someone must be duty-bound to insist that the child be heard, and that the
child's rights be acknowledged and protected. Because lawyers have ethical
obligations to each client beyond that of other advocates, only legal counsel
for the child can fully accomplish this role.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RATIONALE FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL TO CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY

Fundamental due process protection was extended to children in 1967
in In re Gault.' Justice Fortas wrote that, in a case in which a youth faces
commitment "to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed,6 ... neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."7
Justice Fortas continued:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to
be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his libertyfor years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile
needs the assistance of counsel to cope with the problems of law, to
make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to
prepare and submit it. The child "requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."'
The requirement of appointed counsel for every child who appears in
delinquency court is now accepted without question.9

5. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. Id. at 12.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (emphasis added).
9. Although counsel is required in delinquency court, many children still appear without
a lawyer. Waiver of counsel in delinquency court was a matter of deep concern for the Florida Bar

Commission on the Legal Needs of Children. See

FLORIDA BAR, COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL

REPORT 4-12, A.I-A.19 (2d ed. 2002). On January 23, 2003, the
Juvenile Rules Committee of the Florida Bar voted to submit an amendment to Rule 8.165, Fla.
R. Juv. P. to the Florida Supreme Court which would require that a child in delinquency court
have "a meaningful opportunity to confer with counsel regarding the child's right to counsel, the
consequences of waiving counsel, and any other factors that would assist the child in mlking the
decision to waive counsel" before a waiver could be accepted by delinquency court.
NEEDS OF CHILDREN, FINAL
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InArgersingerv. Hamlin,0 a Florida case decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1972 which extended Gideon v. Wainwright" to petty criminal
cases, Justice Douglas wrote: "We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."' 2 Justice Douglas continued: "The run
of misdemeanors will not be affected by today's ruling. But in those that
end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will
receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel" 3 so necessary when
one's liberty is in jeopardy."' 4 Justice Burger, concurring in the opinion,
agreed, noting that "any deprivation of liberty is a serious matter."" It is
clear that in these early, foundational cases regarding the right to counsel,
the concern of the U.S. Supreme Court was the deprivation of liberty rather
than the specific type of case or offender. The issue was, and continues to
be, custody.
In Schall v. Martin,6 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a child could be
detained before trial without bail. After balancing the "desirability of
protecting thejuvenile from his own folly,"' 7 with the infringement upon the
liberty interest of the child, Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[i]n this respect,
the juvenile's liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be
subordinated to the state's 'parenspatriae interest in preserving and
promoting the welfare of the child.""' Here, where the interference with
liberty is meant to protect the child and not to punish, the U.S. Supreme
Court noted that the deprivation of liberty was constitutionally permissible
only because the state provided due process protections, including the right
to counsel. "He is first informed of his rights, including the right to remain
silent and the right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or by a law
guardian assigned by the court..' 9

10. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon is the landmark case that first required counsel to be
provided by the state to all criminally accused people who could not afford to hire their own
attorneys.
12. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 37.
13. The U.S. Supreme Court is referring to In re Gault and Powellv. Alabama. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967); Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
14. Argersinger,407 U.S. at 40 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 41.
16. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
17. Id. at 265.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 275.
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County DepartmentofSocial Services, 21the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the state was not responsible for devastating
injuries inflicted upon a child by his father. The child had been returned to
the father after having been held in the custody of the state as a dependent
child. The Court implied in its opinion that the state would have been held
responsible if the child had remained in its custody. Justice Rehnquist again
described the legal relationship between individuals and the state where
personal freedom is concerned:
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding
duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general wellbeing. The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and
at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs - e.g.,
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety - it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to
protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's
predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from
the limitation
which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own
21
behalf.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the due process rights
of children in dependency proceedings, but DeShaneycomes awfully close.
Due process protection should be required because ofthe interference with
the liberty of the child, the same reason due process is required in
delinquency. Appointment of counsel should be required for all ofthe same
reasons outlined in Gault.22 In both instances the child is in custody; his
rights result from that status.
The deprivation of the liberty of a child who is taken from his or her
family and placed into the custody of the state because he or she has been
abused, neglected, or abandoned is, if anything, more severe than that
suffered by a delinquent child. In dependency the child loses everything home, family, personal belongings, friends, school - involuntarily and
indefinitely. In S.B. v. Departmentof ChildrenandFamilies,23 the Florida

20.
21.
22.
23.

489 U.S. 189 (1989).
Id. at 199-200.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-42 (1967).
825 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2002).
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Fourth District Court of Appeal remarked, while considering the level of
competency that should be required from counsel for the parents, We note
"that dependency proceedings are designed not to punish the parents, but
to protect the children who are, themselves, prisoners."
For a brief shining moment children facing dependency proceedings in
Florida were afforded the right to counsel. In 1977, the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Florida found that due process required
the appointment of counsel to parents in dependency actions.2 4 In response
to the federal court directive, the Judges of the Juvenile and Family Court
of the 11th Judicial Circuit Court of Florida in Dade County, who were the
defendants in the class action case before the Southern District Court,
began to appoint counsel to all parents facing dependency actions, and,
apparently sua sponte, decided to appoint counsel to all the children who
were the subjects ofthe dependency cases. "It is inconceivable to this Court
that while it is required to appoint counsel for indigent parents in
dependency proceedings, that an indigent child, whose interests may be
adverse to the desires of his parents and the State, would not have an
attendant right to appointed counsel."25
Earlier, in a case that still stands as good law, a three-judge panel of the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama found the child
welfare laws of the state unconstitutional and said: "The Plaintiffs maintain
that the Alabama child custody procedure violates the due process clause
of the Constitution because that procedure does not provide for the
appointment of independent counsel to represent. a child in a neglect
proceeding, and none was appointed here. We agree. 2 6 The Alabama
district court referred to In re Gault and explained that "[m]uch the same
reasoning applies to a neglect determination proceeding. The juvenile court
judge should, however, independently appoint counsel for the child,

24. Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258 (S.D. Fla. 1977). Davis was affirmed by the Fifth
Circuit, 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980) and on rehearing en banc, 640 F. 2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981),
but was finally reversed in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Lassiterv. Department
ofSocialServicesofDurham County, North Carolina.Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Of Durham
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see Davis v. Page, 714 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth
Circuit ordered the Florida circuit court to dismiss the case. It is interesting to note that throughout
the arduous history of this case in the federal courts there is no mention of the right of subject
children to counsel in dependency cases, except for a footnote in the original U.S. district court
opinion that states that "the question of whether the Court should provide for appointment of
independent counsel to represent the child in dependency proceedings is not before this Court."
Davis, 442 F. Supp. at 265.
25. The original orders of the circuit court were not published. This quote from the orders
appears in In the Interest ofD.B. and D.S., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).

26. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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requiring the parents, if they are financially able, to pay for this legal
representation.
If the parents are indigent, free counsel should be afforded
27
the child.

Back in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court rendered its opinion in an
appeal, brought by the state of Florida, of the Dade County judges' orders
which required the state to pay for the attorneys that the circuit court, in
response to a federal court order, was appointing to every parent and child
in its dependency cases. In In the Interest ofD.B. andD.S.,2" it held simply
that "there is no constitutional right to counsel for the subject child in a
juvenile dependency proceeding." This is the law that still stands today in
Florida. A review of the history of these events reveals that this holding is
an obiter dictum, based solely on an obiter dictum from an order in the
lower court. The issue of counsel for the children was not raised by the
parties in the original case before the lower court. Such an important ruling
should not stand without full exposition ofthe facts, briefing and argument.
Justice Pariente stated in her recent opinion, requiring "a meaningful
opportunity to be heard"29 for children in the custody of the state and facing
placement in residential mental health facilities, that "[a]lthough in D.B. [the
Florida Supreme Court] discussed the constitutional rights of parents
whose parental rights the Department sought to terminate, [the Florida
Supreme Court] did not discuss the nature and extent of the child's
constitutional rights in a dependency proceeding except to find that there
was 'no constitutional right to counsel."' 3 The constitutional right of
children facing involuntary placement into the custody of the state to be
assisted by legal counsel is an issue that begs to be discussed fully as soon
as possible.
Commentator Michael J. Dale concludes in his comprehensive review
of the status of legal representation of children in dependency proceedings
that "[t]he need for attorney representation of children in the context of
dependency proceedings is irrefutable."'" The decisions made in a
dependency proceeding are of much greater consequence to children,
especially in reference to the fundamental right to liberty, than they are to
any of the adults involved.

27. Id.
28. In the Interest ofD.B, and D.S,, 385 So. 2d at 91.
29. M.W. v. Davis, 756 So. 2d 90, 108 (Fla. 2000).

30. Id.
at 97.
31. Michael J.Dale, Providing Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedings in Florida,
25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 813 (2001).
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A child placed in the custody of the state has important rights regarding
the conditions and duration of care that must be monitored and enforced.
Dale observes:
The need for counsel was recently rendered more urgent by the
federal district court's opinion in Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush.
The court dismissed the central claims in a statewide class action
challenging conditions in foster care in Florida in part on grounds
that there was an adequate state forum in which the children could
obtain relief. The federal court abstained in light of "the ongoing
jurisdiction and ability of plaintiffs to raise constitutional claims in
dependency court." The federal court never discussed who would
raise these claims or how they would do it.32
Children who come before the circuit court in dependency surely must
be entitled to fundamental due process protection, including the right to
counsel. There simply is no good reason for due process to be denied. It is
only a matter of time, and of the right case finding its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court or Florida Supreme Court, before the law will require
fundamental due process protection for all children whose liberty is
restricted by the state, whether the restriction results from delinquency or
dependency. Florida should act now through its legislature to extend this
protection.
The unified family court system will make it possible to provide such
legal services to children. Having one court for all of these cases will allow
the lawyers for children to focus on the child and his or her legal needs,
rather than the particular legal pigeonhole into which the problem may fit.
One lawyer can represent one client (or group of sibling clients, if there are
no conflicts in their interests) on all the issues before one judge delinquency, dependency, custody, visitation, child support resulting from
divorce, emancipation, mental health3" -. everything that comes before the

32. Dale, supra note 31, at 777 n.46 (citing Foster Children Bonnie L. v. Bush, 108 F. Supp.
2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2001)).
33. Subsequent to its ruling in M.W, the Florida Supreme Court decided that the
appointment of counsel to a child in state custody facing placement in a residential mental health
treatment facility is mandatory rather than discretionary, and ordered. the Juvenile Rules
Committee of the Florida Bar to draft a new Rule of juvenile procedure to accomplish this
purpose. See Amendment to the Rules of Juenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d
1206 (Fla. 2001). The new rule was finally adopted on March 6, 2003. See Amendment to the
Roles of Juvenile Procedure, FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350, Supreme Court of Florida No. SC00-2044
(Mar. 6, 2003).
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family court. This system will lead to comprehensive solutions that will
benefit the child, the family, the court, and the community.
IV. A SYSTEM FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN THE
UNIFIED FAMILY COURT

The Florida Supreme Court has commented in detail on the Report of
the Family Court Steering Committee and accepted almost all of its
recommendations.34 The mandate of the Florida Supreme Court is broad.
When fully implemented, the unified family court will undoubtedly result in
a sea of change in the way families are treated and in the way they respond
family court. Consolidation and coordination of cases is
to the unified
"critical" 35 to accomplish these goals while conserving the resources of the
unified family court. Case management, self-help programs, alternative
dispute resolution, Guardians ad Litem, social and educational programs,
and technology are all characterized as essential elements of the new
system.36 This is going to be expensive. The Florida Supreme Court said:
"Although we endorse these essential elements, we also note that the failure
to adequately fund the necessary services ultimately will result in the failure
of the model family court concept."37 The Florida Supreme Court also
mandates training and continuing education ofjudges and court personnel.3"
This will be expensive as well. Can we also provide experienced and welltrained attorneys for children? We can, and we must.
Children sometimes appear in dependency court with counsel now.
Most of the judicial circuits in Florida have Guardian ad Litem programs
(GALs). In a few of the circuits those GALs are lawyers. In those cases, the
GAL may choose to represent the child in a traditional attorney-client
relationship. However, because in Florida the GAL is part of the circuit
court, it is not clear whether an attorney acting as GAL must resolve
divided loyalties. For example, is an attorney/GAL to report to the circuit
court on the best interests of the child, or is the attorney/GAL to present
the wishes of the child? Even more important, in most circuits GALs are
not lawyers but are lay volunteers who are unable to act as attorneys. In
most instances, if the GAL program has access to attorneys, those attorneys

represent the GAL program and its volunteers, not the child. Although

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

In re Report of Family Court Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 533-34.
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Guardians ad Litem are "essential elements"39 of a model family court
system, they cannot adequately represent the constitutional rights and legal
interests of the children before the circuit court.
Occasionally, judges will appoint a lawyer to represent a child in a
dependency case in which the circuit court is concerned about protection
of the rights of the child or when the circuit court wants to hear from the
child. Our experience at Gator TeamChild has shown that judges who do
appoint lawyers to represent children find that their ability to make more
fully informed and comprehensive decisions is enhanced. Well-trained
lawyers who can provide information to the circuit court by filing motions
and legal briefs, presenting evidence, conducting thorough investigations,
and bringing in expert witnesses serve to improve the quality of the
decision-making process.
Generally, lawyers who represent children come from a variety of
sources. They may be found in a law school clinical program, like Gator
TeamChild. Student attorneys generally display a deep commitment to their
clients. They are often wonderfully talented and enthusiastic advocates.
They are able to devote the time and attention to a child client that a busy,
practicing attorney could not. However, law school clinic students can
handle only a few cases during their limited time in the program. Law
school clinics will provide the training for the child advocates of the future,
but cannot fill the current need for lawyers in the current day-to-day
operation of the model family court.
A few Florida legal services programs have lawyers who represent child
clients exclusively. ° These programs tend to emphasize one area of law or
take only one type of client. This representation is valuable and important.
However, because legal services lawyers typically represent parents in
dependency cases, the legal services system may not be available to provide
representation to children in those cases.
Court-appointed Attorneys ad Litem in dependency cases may be
volunteers who receive pro bono credit through local bar or legal services
programs, or may even be paid court-appointed counsel. These attorneys
are often inexperienced in the complexities of the law from the point of
view of the child. If paid, they are quite expensive. No complete system for
appointment of counsel for children, except for the public defender system
for children in delinquency court, exists in Florida. For the unified family

39. In re Report of Family Court Steering Comm., 794 So. 2d at 527.

40. Examples are the Teamchild program in Tallahassee, a collaboration between Legal
Services of North Florida and the Second Circuit Public Defender, and the Special Education and
Mental Health Unit of Central Florida Legal Services in Daytona Beach.
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court model to work, the training, experience, and accountability of
attorneys must be consistent, and sufficiently qualified lawyers will have to
be available to handle the job.
We should first look to our existing public defender offices to provide
the experienced counsel that will be needed to represent children within the
model family court. Public defenders who work in thejuvenile departments
of their various offices are the only lawyers within our public advocacy
systems who are trained and experienced in representing child clients in a
traditional attorney-client relationship. The public defender system
infrastructure is vast. This infrastructure would be fiscally advantageous
because it makes it possible to use existing resources to provide facilities
and personnel that are already in place.
Using existing resources would also make it possible for representation
ofchildren in dependency court to start immediately, especially in the most
problematic cases - the crossover cases. In those cases in which the child
already has a relationship with a public defender on his or her delinquency
case, the court could simply appoint the same lawyer to be present and
represent the child on the dependency matters. We have found at Gator
TeamChild, where we often represent a child on both dependency and
delinquency matters, that this dual, overlapping representation enhances our
ability to help our clients find real solutions to the problems they face.
Access to both systems allows us to increase the options for services that
are available to our clients. Finding solutions through the dependency
system keeps our clients out of harsh, punitive programs that are now the
order of the day in the delinquency system.
This will be a significant burden upon the already stressed office of the
public defender in Florida. Funds will have to be found for the addition of
new lawyers to already existing offices, and for training for lawyers already
employed and working. But doing so will be less expensive than other
options, and will be cost effective.
Further, juvenile public defenders throughout the state share a
reputation for professionalism. Through their training and experience, they
develop an ethic of loyalty to their child clients that is sometimes difficult
for lawyers who generally represent adults to internalize. We should take
advantage of the wealth of talent and experience that exists now to assist
children in delinquency court and make those talented and committed
lawyers available to dependent children. We need to do this now.
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V. CONCLUSION

A new day is dawning in the family law courts in Florida. The adoption
by the Florida Supreme Court of the recommendations of the Family Court
Steering Committee for a unified family court based on the philosophy of
therapeutic jurisprudence will, once fully implemented, result in a court
system actually capable of supporting families and children and helping
them find solutions to their problems.
The extension offundamental due process rights - particularly the right
to counsel - to children who are the subject of cases in the unified family
court is long overdue. The provision of an attorney for every child who is
faced with placement into the custody of the state is not only
constitutionally mandated, but it will contribute to the success of the
enterprise. Attorneys for the children involved will serve to keep the new
system honest.
Implementation of this expansive and progressive idea of a new court
system will be expensive. A commitment by state government to fund the
system will ultimately prove cost effective, but start-up will be difficult. Use
of our already existing and excellent public defender system to provide
representation to children in the most difficult crossover cases could happen
immediately, without tremendous start-up costs. This first step toward a
more effective, more fair system for children should be taken immediately.

